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1 Introduction
What is the appropriate domain of a currency area? Robert Mundell (1961)’s seminal ques-
tion is today as pertinent as ever. At the turn of the new millennium, twelve Western
European countries instituted the euro as legal tender, delegating monetary policy to the
European Central Bank (ECB). Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia formally joined the
euro area more recently, and a number of other states, including Andorra, Kosovo, Mon-
tenegro, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City, unilaterally adopted the euro as their sole
currency.1 Furthermore, a growing group, including Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, is
currently negotiating accession, while others, among them Britain, Denmark, and Iceland,
have maintained ongoing debates on the advisability of adopting the euro, particularly after
the onset of the current financial crisis.
Moving South, six Gulf Cooperation Council countries originally planned to introduce
a common currency, the Khaleeji, in 2010 but recently postponed its introduction, partly
because of the financial crisis. Six members of the Economic Community of West African
States have agreed to create a new common currency by the year 2015, and eleven members
of the Southern African Development Community have agreed to adopt a common currency
by 2018. Finally, and in a less tangible future, the East African Community plans to create
a new common currency.2
This reshaping of the international monetary arrangement, actual or planned, has rein-
vigorated the theoretical and empirical debate over the wisdom of currency unions.
1They diﬀer from the formal members in that they do not have a vote in the ECB.
2Details of the countries involved in these prospective currency unions are given in the Supplemental
Table 1.
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The case for joining a currency union rests on two main benefits. The first is the elimina-
tion of currency conversion costs and the disturbances in relative prices coming from nomi-
nal exchange rate fluctuations; lower transaction costs and greater predictability encourage
deeper integration in goods and capital markets. This is the main benefit emphasized in
Mundell (1961), as well as one of the main preoccupations of nineteenth century economists,
as famously expressed by John Stuart Mill (1848):
“So much of barbarism, however, still remains in the transactions of the most
civilized nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their
nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbours,
a peculiar currency of their own.”
Related to this point, Mundell (1961) also emphasized that a broader currency area reduces
the scope for speculation and hence volatility in foreign exchange markets, as in thicker
markets single speculators are less likely to aﬀect exchange rates. This increases the value
of money as a medium of exchange and likely leads to higher market integration.
The second benefit from joining a currency union is its potential to discipline policies,
in particular to combat inflation, insofar as the anchor country (or the union’s monetary
authority) is better able to commit to monetary rules. The gain from commitment stemming
from currency unions was recently emphasized by Alesina & Barro (2002).3
The main argument against currency unions, from the perspective of a member country,
is the loss of independence to tailor monetary policy to local needs. There are, however,
3For earlier contributions, see Giavazzi & Giovannini (1989) and Alesina & Grilli (1992), who focused on
the Barro & Gordon (1983) trade-oﬀ between commitment and flexibility of fixed versus flexible exchange
rate regimes in the context of the European Monetary Union.
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certain conditions under which this loss is relatively small, typically known as the optimum
currency area (OCA) criteria.4 Specifically, a currency union will tend to be less costly for
countries that feature high comovement of economic variables vis-à-vis other countries in the
union, as this increases the consensus over the direction of monetary policy (Mundell, 1961).5
Similarly, a currency union will be less costly if there is a high level of labor mobility within
the union, and/or high degrees of wage and price flexibility, as these conditions facilitate full
employment, reducing the need for active policy (and, at the same time, they reduce the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, and thus the value of monetary independence–Mundell,
1961).
Furthermore, the cost of joining a union will tend to decrease with fiscal integration or,
more generally, with the availability of public or private mechanisms to smooth out diverse
shocks through regional transfers (Kenen, 1969); in the same vein, capital market integration
will tend to lower the cost of joining, insofar as it allows countries to smooth consumption in
the face of idiosyncratic shocks (Mundell, 1973, and Buiter & Sibert, 2008). A currency union
will also tend to be less costly for a country with a high degree of sectoral diversification, as
this will provide some insulation against a variety of shocks, avoiding the need for changes
in exchange rates (Kenen, 1969). On a diﬀerent line, joining a currency union may also
be less costly for small, open (price-taking) economies–for which the prices of tradeables
4An “optimum currency area” refers to the geographical area over which it is optimal (in terms of welfare)
to have a single or common currency, rather than separate or national currencies. (A long tradition in the
literature has equated optimality with the achievement of three goals: full employment, domestic price
stability and balance of payments equilibrium.)
5Others scholars, most notably Fleming (1971), have argued that ex-ante similarity in inflation rates
among union members is also important for the sustainability of the union.
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(both imports and exports) are flexible–because nominal exchange rates in this case become
ineﬀective as a mechanism to aﬀect terms of trade, and hence to restore external balance
(McKinnon, 1963).
None of the OCA criteria in this non-exhaustive list is necessary or suﬃcient, and some
may even seemmutually contradictory. For example, to achieve stabilization, Mundell (1961)
emphasizes the importance of synchronization of shocks within a currency union, as it re-
duces the cost of the loss of monetary independence; by contrast, Mundell (1973) and Buiter
& Sibert (2008) argue that asynchronous shocks can be beneficial in a currency union with
integrated capital markets as they increase the scope for risk-diversification within the union.
Similarly, while Kenen (1969) suggests that highly diversified (and presumably large) devel-
oped economies will be better suited to form a currency union, McKinnon (1963) argues
that small, commodity economies will make ideal candidates. Furthermore, while Fleming
(1971) argues that similarity in inflation rates is important, Alesina & Barro (2002) make
the point that high-inflation countries may gain significantly from joining a currency union
with committed low-inflation countries.
Moreover, the OCA criteria are likely to be aﬀected once countries join the union, a point
voiced, among others, by Mundell (1961) and Krugman (1993). The point was addressed
empirically by Frankel & Rose (1998), who found that trade increases the synchronization
of business cycles, and more directly tested by Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro & Tenreyro
(2007), who find that currency unions aﬀect the pattern of comovement of price and output
shocks across countries.
While the theoretical arguments for and against currency unions are intuitively appealing
and fairly well understood, a first limitation of the literature is that, until very recently,
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there has been little progress in the empirical assessment of the gains and (particularly) the
costs from joining a currency union. A second, perhaps more important, limitation is the
regrettable lack of a unifying framework to weigh the various gains and losses from forming
a currency union. A demanding critic could well say that the OCA theory is still now little
more than an enumeration of non-commensurable criteria.
In the rest of the paper we discuss in more detail the various benefits and costs stemming
from currency unions, and critically review recent empirical developments attempting to
quantify them. In the process, we highlight some econometric problems in existing empirical
work, and propose solutions where possible. A spin-oﬀ of this work is to provide a diﬀerent
assessment of the eﬀect of the euro on diﬀerent economic outcomes. In particular, and in
contrast with empirical estimates of the trade eﬀect of other currency unions, we find that the
eﬀect of the euro on trade has been close to zero. The diﬀerences can be potentially explained
by the diﬀerent characteristics of countries taking part in monetary unions other than the
euro, typically very small and low-income economies. Our finding also stands in contrast
with previous estimates of the eﬀect of the euro on trade. As we show, these estimates tend
to reflect the fact that euro-zone countries historically traded much more intensively than
other groups; but there is little evidence that the introduction of the euro had a diﬀerential
eﬀect on trade among these countries when compared with other developed countries that
are not in the euro zone. We conclude with a discussion of some open issues and a possible
way forward for the theory of currency unions. Given space constraints, for some important
issues pertaining to the gains and costs of currency unions, we will simply provide some of
the leading references.
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2 The Benefits
2.1 Increased trade
The main benefit from a currency area envisaged by Mundell (1961) was a trade increase
stemming from the elimination of currency conversion costs and the possibly greater pre-
dictability of prices. Forty years later, Rose (2000) would present the first systematic attempt
to quantify the eﬀect of currency unions on trade.6 Rose (2000) estimated that sharing a
common currency increased bilateral trade between countries by over 200 percent. The re-
sult raised a not small amount of skepticism, and a large number of papers, including some
by Rose, investigated the robustness of the initial finding. The literature spawned by Rose
(2000)’s paper is too large for this review to be comprehensive, so we will just highlight the
main issues that qualify the initial finding and discuss the conclusions generally drawn from
this literature.7
2.1.1 The results of Rose and subsequent studies
The empirical work on the eﬀects of currency unions on trade has been framed within the
standard “gravity equation” model (for early references on the theoretical foundations of the
6There were a number of attempts to estimate the eﬀect of exchange rate variability on trade, and the
general consensus emerging from that literature is that there is only a small eﬀect. See for example Frankel &
Wei (1993), Eichengreen & Irwin (1995), Frankel (1997), Tenreyro (2007), and the references therein. For a
more general theoretical investigation of the eﬀects of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes, see Obstfeld
& Rogoﬀ (1995). Some scholars have argued, however, that currency unions go far beyond the elimination
of exchange rate variability and that there should be a big discontinuity going from small variability to the
certain and committed absence of exchange rate fluctuations.
7For a thorough review, see Baldwin (2006).
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gravity equation for trade, see Anderson, 1979, Helpman, 1981, and Helpman & Krugman,
1985). The model states that the bilateral trade flow from country i to country j, denoted
by Tij, increases with the sizes of the countries (typically, proxied by their gross domestic
product, GDP) denoted by Yi and Yj, and decreases with their distance, broadly construed
to include all factors that create trade resistance, and collected in the vector xij.8 The vector
of costs xij is then augmented with a dummy variable, CU , indicating whether or not the
countries share the same currency. To account for deviations from the theory, a multiplicative
stochastic term ηij with unit conditional mean, E(ηij|Yi, Yj, xij, CUij) = 1, is included in the
model, leading to
Tij = α0Y α1i Y
α2
j exp(xijβ + γCUij)ηij, (1)
where α0, α1, α2, β, and γ are unknown parameters. The factor exp(γ) is the enhancement
eﬀect from sharing a common currency and is the main parameter of interest. Following a
long tradition in the trade literature, Rose (2000) log-linearized equation (1) and estimated
the parameters of interest by least squares using the equation
ln (Tij) = ln (α0) + α1 ln (YiYj) + xijβ + γCUij + ln
¡
ηij
¢
, (2)
which imposes α1 = α2, as in many theoretical formulations.9
To estimate the equation, Rose (2000) put together a large dataset with bilateral trade
data for 186 countries for five years spanning 1970 through 1990. Subsequent work by Glick
& Rose (2002) extended the coverage to 217 countries from 1948 through 1997.
8We interpret xij broadly here, to include (in a more complete specification) multilateral resistance terms,
as in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003).
9The dependent variable used by Rose (2000) is the average of the two-way bilateral trade flows, instead
of the unidirectional trade flows.
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This estimation procedure implicitly makes a number of assumptions that have been
questioned by subsequent work and which we discuss in turn.
Selection into currency unions There are basically two types of currency unions in
Rose’s data. One is a client-anchor arrangement in which typically small or poor nations
adopt the currency of a large country. The second type of currency unions corresponds to
multilateral unions.
As pointed out, among others, by Persson (2001) and Tenreyro (2002), these currency
unions were not randomly formed. On the contrary, self-selection into currency unions is
strongly hinted at by some distinctive features shared by countries that have been part of
common currency areas during the pre-euro period, and included in Rose’s dataset. Because
of this self-selection, in general, the OLS estimates of γ in (1) cannot be given a causal
interpretation. Indeed, in datasets of this nature, there is ample margin for the existence
of uncontrolled systematic diﬀerences in characteristics between members and non-members
of currency unions, which will be picked-up by the OLS estimate of γ.10 For example, cul-
tural and historical links may increase the propensity to form a currency union as well as
strengthen trade links between two countries. Moreover, countries that decide to join a cur-
rency union might also be more likely to foster integration through other means, for example,
by encouraging the harmonization of standards and by reducing regulatory barriers.11
10Rose (2000) also acknowledged this potential problem, but rejected its quantitative relevance by resorting
to an instrumental-variable approach whereby the currency-union indicator was instrumented with inflation
rates. These estimates were “implausibly bigger,” in his own words, and the overall strategy was not very
compelling.
11Other unobservable variables, such as market power, may have the opposite eﬀect on the OLS estimates:
higher levels of monopoly distortion in the economy may lead to higher inflation rates under discretion and
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To address this issue, Persson (2001) employs a matching technique that controls for
self-selection.12 Using Rose (2000)’s data, he finds an increase in trade of between 13 and
66 percent, although the results are not statistically significant. In response to Persson’s
critique, Rose (2001) shows that a similar technique applied to a broader dataset yields
statistically significant results, in the range of 21 to 43 percent.
An alternative strategy used in many studies, including Glick & Rose (2002), is to include
country-pair fixed eﬀects in the gravity equation; this inclusion reduced the currency union
eﬀect to about 100 percent.13 These controls, however, may not completely eliminate the
problem because a shift at some point in time in trade volumes may be related to a change
in the propensity to use a common currency. For example, countries that historically broke
with a currency union often saw their trade collapse due to independence wars followed by
the deliberate adoption of protectionist policies (Thom & Walsh, 2002). To the extent that
these unmeasured (or hard to measure) characteristics aﬀect, or are correlated with, both
the propensity to share a common currency and the volume of bilateral trade, OLS estimates
of γ will not identify the causal eﬀect of currency unions on trade. Indeed, Thom & Walsh
(2002) found no eﬀect in Anglo-Irish trade when Ireland abandoned the sterling peg in 1979;
thereby increase the need to join a currency union as a commitment device to reduce inflation. See Alesina
& Barro (2002).
12See also Kenen (2002).
13Pakko & Wall (2001) also controlled for fixed eﬀects in Rose (2000)’s dataset, finding no significant trade
eﬀect. As said, Glick & Rose (2002) use a broader dataset. Estimates of the same order of magnitude of
Glick-Rose were found by Rose & van Wincoop (2001), who controlled for (time invariant) country-specific
eﬀects; see more below. Nitsch (2002) argued that most of the eﬀect in Glick-Rose came from trade collapses
after currency separations, while the eﬀect from joining a currency union on trade was about 8 percent.
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they stress that the Anglo-Irish case is a rare example of a long-established currency union
breaking up in otherwise stable circumstances.14
Diﬀerent ways of tackling the problems caused by self-selection into the currency unions
are explored in Tenreyro (2002), who employs a standard Heckman (1979) selection model
that controls for selection on unobservables, and in Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro &Tenreyro
(2007), who use a three-step instrumental-variable (IV) approach. The first stage estimates
the propensity that a country will enter a currency union with a main anchor; these results
are interesting in their own right, as they elucidate part of the reason why countries adopt
a foreign currency or join currency unions. The IV is then obtained by computing the joint
probability that two countries, independently, adopt the same currency. The underlying
assumption in the analysis is that there exist factors driving the decision to adopt a third
country’s currency that are independent of the bilateral links between any two potential
clients. In other words, the basic idea is to isolate the motive that relates to third countries’
currencies and use this motivation as an IV for whether two countries do or do not share
a common currency. The general message from these regressions is that a currency union
is more likely when countries speak the same language, are geographically close, and share
former colonial links. In terms of client-anchor arrangements, a union is more likely when
the client is poorer and smaller and the anchor is richer. The IV approach generated large
estimates of the eﬀect of currency unions on trade, comparable and in some case even bigger
14Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc (2003) found that the recent break-ups of currency unions in Central and Eastern
Europe were followed by dramatic drops in bilateral trade, though they warn that the currency separation
cannot be disentangled from the political disintegration, unlike the Anglo-Irish case. Nonetheless, De Sousa
& Lamotte (2007) challenge their result and argue that the fall in trade was rather smooth.
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than Rose (2000)’s, while the Heckman approach produced estimates in the order of 50
percent, though more imprecisely estimated, more in line with Persson (2001).
One criticism to all these studies, however, is that they do not appropriately control
for possibly time-varying “multilateral resistance” terms in the gravity equation, a con-
cept introduced by Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003) and emphasized by Baldwin (2006),
who argues that properly controlling for time-varying fixed eﬀects significantly reduces the
currency-union eﬀect. Another criticism is that most of these studies averaged two-way bi-
lateral trade flows, instead of using the unidirectional trade flows suggested by theoretical
models, thus ignoring bilateral trade imbalances, though it is not obvious in which direction
this may aﬀect the results.
Heteroskedasticity and zeroes in trade data Most of the studies mentioned above
resort to the common practice of taking logarithms to linearize the gravity equation as in (2),
and estimate its parameters by OLS. Even in the absence of other problems, this procedure
can generate substantial biases for two reasons.
First, in trade datasets, it is unlikely that the variance of ηij in (1) will be independent of
the countries’ sizes and of the various measures of distance, xij. Since the expected value of
the logarithm of a random variable depends both on its mean and on higher-order moments
of its distribution, whenever the variance of the error term ηij in equation (1) depends on the
regressors, the conditional expectation of ln
¡
ηij
¢
will also depend on the regressors, violating
the condition for consistency of OLS. Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) find this to be a serious
source of bias in practical applications of the gravity equation.
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Second, as a result of the logarithmic transformation, pairs of countries for which bilateral
exports are zero have to be dropped from the sample. In a typical dataset, this leads to the
loss of over 30 percent of the data points. This massive sample selection, which is particularly
problematic when one considers small or poor countries (such as the ones that have been
clients in or part of multilateral currency unions in Rose’s data), can cause additional biases
in the estimation.
These two problems can be addressed by estimating the gravity equation in its mul-
tiplicative form. Specifically, Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) propose a pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PML)15 technique that is particularly well suited to the estimation of gravity
equations, though it has not been applied to estimate the eﬀect of currency unions.16
2.1.2 Trade eﬀects of currency unions and the case of the euro
Despite the empirical issues raised in reaction to Rose (2000)’s original estimates, subsequent
work by Rose or other scholars still found far from negligible eﬀects on trade from pre-euro
currency areas, and a consensus grew that currency unions indeed enhance trade, even
if by less than initially estimated. Projections for the euro area were, however, hard to
make because the euro zone (EZ) involved relatively richer countries that were already fairly
integrated. So, time was needed to gauge the euro eﬀect.
In a first attempt, Micco et al. (2003) conclude that the euro increased trade among
EZ members by between 8 and 16 percent, when compared to other European Union (EU)
members not using the euro, and by 4 to 10 percent, when compared to a broader sam-
15See Gourieroux et al. (1984).
16Helpman et al. (2008) oﬀer an alternative way to deal with the presence of zeros. Their method, however,
is heavily dependent on incidental distributional assumptions.
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ple of developed countries. The authors used the gravity equation framework, estimating
their models with data from 1992 through 2002, and including country-pair fixed eﬀects in
some specifications. Subsequent work on the euro eﬀect, including Bun & Klaasen (2002,
2007), Flam & Nordstrom (2003, 2006), Baldwin & Taglione (2006), Baldwin et al. (2005),
Gil-Pareja et al. (2008), and Baldwin (2006), among many others, have addressed various
specification issues in Micco et al. (2003) (e.g., using unidirectional trade flows, post 1993
data,17 etc.), generally confirming the positive eﬀects of the euro on trade. The range of
estimates for the euro eﬀect goes from 2 percent in Baldwin (2006) to more than 70 percent
in Gil-Pareja et al. (2008). For a comprehensive survey, see Baldwin (2006).18 A notable
exception to this trend is the work of Berger & Nitsch (2008), who find instead no significant
eﬀect.
Given the disparity of results, we think it useful to provide our own estimates of the euro
eﬀect. For that, we use a very simple diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences specification, comparing the
exports of the so-called Euro-12 (Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) to those of similar groups of
trading partners. In particular, we consider the following three control groups.
The first group includes only the countries that were part of the EU in 1999, but so far did
not adopt the euro: Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Throughout, this control
group will be referred to as EU15. This group of three countries is interesting because it
17Changes in statistical procedures introduce a break in the series in 1993.
18Work by Baldwin & Di Nino (2006), Flam & Nordstrom (2006), and Berthou & Fontagné (2008),
investigated in particular the hypothesis that the euro has increased the number of goods that are traded
(extensive margin), finding ample confirmation for this hypothesis.
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only includes countries that are very similar to those of the Euro-12, but it has the drawback
of being quite small.
In the second group, the set of countries is expanded by adding three other members
of the European Economic Area (EEA): Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. This control
group, which will be referred to as EEA, represents perhaps the best compromise between
comparability with the treatment group and sample size.
The final control group sacrifices the degree of homogeneity to allow the use of an even
larger sample. This is achieved by including five additional countries that were members of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1993: Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. This group will be labeled OECD93.
Before presenting estimates of the euro eﬀect, it is interesting to graphically study the
evolution of trade among the Euro-12 countries, and compare it with that of the countries
in the control groups defined above. The data on exports used to construct these graphs are
from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF DOTS), and the
data on GDP are from the OECD STAT database. Given the break mentioned before, our
sample runs from 1993 to 2007.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the exports of the Euro-12 countries to trading partners
in the same group (depicted with circles) and to OECD93 countries (depicted with squares),
both relative to the total GDP of the Euro-12. Additionally, the Figure also shows the
exports from the eleven OECD93 countries to the members of this group (depicted with
triangles) and to the Euro-12 countries (depicted with crosses), both relative to the total
GDP of the OECD93 countries. All the series are normalized so that they equal 1 for the
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first year of the sample. Similar plots for EEA and EU15 are presented as Supplemental
Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
These figures suggest that, if there was a euro eﬀect on trade, it was almost certainly
small. Yet, applying the same estimation approach followed by Micco et al. (2003) on these
data, would yield a strong and statistically significant eﬀect of the euro (these results are
available from the authors on request), a finding that at first is hard to reconcile with the
graphical evidence.
With this conflicting evidence as a background, we approach the estimation of the euro
eﬀect on trade by considering an augmented gravity equation as in (1). However, we depart
from previous studies on this topic by including in the model a dummy, labeled Euro-
12 dummy, which identifies the “treatment group”. That is, irrespective of the year, the
Euro-12 dummy is equal to 1 for the pairs where both countries are part of the Euro-12
group. This dummy is included to control for possible unobservable systematic diﬀerences
in characteristics between pairs of members of the Euro-12, and other pairs.
As in previous studies, the euro eﬀect is measured by a dummy which is equal to one
when, in the relevant year, both partners share the euro as their oﬃcial currency. As before,
this dummy is labeled CU , and is the main regressor of interest.
Finally, the model also contains a standard set of dummies capturing sources of trade
resistance. Specifically, the model includes dummies indicating contiguity, common language
and colonial ties, as in Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006); a dummy for the existence of a free
trade agreement (FTA) between the countries in the pair, constructed using information
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provided by the World Trade Organization webpage;19 as well as time-varying importer and
exporter fixed eﬀects, as suggested by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). We also control for
bilateral distance (computed using the great circle distance algorithm provided by Andrew
Gray, 2004). However, rather than just including the log of the distance as a regressor, we
allow the distance to have a more flexible eﬀect by dividing it into its four quartiles and
interacting the log of distance with dummies for each quartile.
Table 1 presents the main estimation results for the three samples defined by the diﬀerent
control groups. All estimates were obtained using the Poisson PML estimator of Santos Silva
& Tenreyro (2006). The results for the standard gravity variables are as expected and the
only remark to add is that indeed we find that the eﬀect of log-distance is not linear. More
interesting is the fact that we find the eﬀect of theEuro-12 dummy, the regressor identifying
the treatment group, to be strong and statistically very significant. This indicates that, even
before the euro was created, the trade between the Euro-12 was already considerably stronger
than between comparable countries, even those that were part of the EU.
As for the main regressor of interest, the estimates obtained for the coeﬃcient of CU are
small and not statistically significant at the usual 5% level. For the sample with the OECD93
control group, the coeﬃcient of CU is only marginally insignificant, but the point estimate is
actually negative, suggesting that bilateral trade between countries that adopted the euro has
increased by less than trade among comparable countries not sharing the common currency.
19When the comparison groups are EU15 or EEA, the coeﬃcient on this dummy is not identified because
all countries are linked by free trade agreements during the period spanned by our sample.
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Taken as a whole, the low t-statistics for the coeﬃcient of CU , coupled with the variability
of its estimates across the diﬀerent samples, strongly suggests that the eﬀect of the euro on
trade was negligible.
In order to check the adequacy of the specification used, we performed RESET tests
(Ramsey, 1969), as described in Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006). The bottom line of Table
1 reports the p-values of the RESET tests for the three samples, neither of which provides
evidence against the null hypothesis of adequate model specification. Although departures
from it would have only minor consequences, we also checked the implicit assumption that
the conditional variance of Tij is proportional to the conditional mean, and again we were
unable to reject the null for the three cases considered.
As a robustness check, we have also estimated models excluding CU , but interacting
the Euro-12 dummy with dummies for the diﬀerent years. These models, which also passed
the specification tests described above, lead to results that are remarkably close to those
reported in Table 1. In particular, the new dummy variables are generally not statistically
significant, therefore providing no significant evidence of a euro eﬀect.
In view of these results we conclude that, after controlling for the fact that the Euro-12
countries already traded much more intensively in the past, there is little evidence that the
creation of the euro had an eﬀect on trade. Although the methods used are quite diﬀerent,
our results reinforce those of Berger & Nitsch (2008), who also emphasized the need to
account for the fact that the Euro-12 countries were already strongly integrated before the
euro was created.
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2.2 Increased capital integration
The trade increase from a common currency area envisaged by Mundell (1961) also con-
cerned trade in assets. As many advocates of currency unions have argued, a common
currency should foster deeper and more liquid financial markets, and possibly higher lev-
els of cross-border investment (through equities and foreign direct investment, FDI), given
lower transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate risks.20 More integrated finan-
cial markets should, in turn, increase the allocative eﬃciency of capital, and allow for higher
diversification of shocks, mitigating their impact on consumption.
Measuring the eﬀect of monetary unions on capital markets poses similar econometric
challenges to those discussed in the previous Section. There have been, however, several
recent attempts in the literature, mostly trying to assess the change in capital market inte-
gration with the advent of the euro. For a thorough analysis, see Japelli & Pagano (2008)
and the comprehensive survey by Lane (2006).21 The consensual findings are i) a swift in-
tegration of the EZ bond market following the introduction of the euro, with a sharp fall in
yield diﬀerentials across member countries; ii) an increase in cross-border bond and equity
holdings, as well as FDI activity among EZ countries. There is, nevertheless, a broad range
of estimates of the euro eﬀect. In the interest of space, we do not attempt to summarize
the literature, but provide the reader with a set of plots that can give an indication of the
magnitudes involved.
20See, among others, Martin & Rey (2004), Papaioannou & Portes (2008) and Lane (2006).
21For another excellent survey see Mongelli & Wylplosz (2008), and for more specific studies on the
channels, see Baele et al. (2004), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2009), and Spiegel (2008).
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Using the same groups defined before, Supplemental Figure 3 shows the holdings by Euro-
12 countries of bonds issued by other Euro-12 countries, relative to the total GDP of Euro-12
countries. The series thus describes the holdings by the typical Euro-12 country of other
Euro-12 countries’ bonds relative to GDP. To provide a benchmark, the Figure also shows
the holdings by Euro-12 countries of bonds issued by the eleven countries in the OECD93
group, relative to the total GDP of Euro-12 countries. For completeness, the Figure also
displays the total holdings by the OECD93 countries of bonds issued by other countries of
the same group, and by the Euro-12 countries, both relative to the total GDP of the OECD93
countries. All series are normalized to 1 for the first year of the sample. Similar plots for
EEA and EU15 are presented as Supplemental Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
Supplemental Figures 6 to 8 depict the corresponding holdings of equity, and Supplemen-
tal Figures 9 to 11 depict the FDI outflows for the diﬀerent bilateral combinations. Both for
bonds and equity, the data are available in 1997 and then again annually from 2001 to 2007;
the data come from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). The data
on FDI come from the OECD STAT database.
The Figures show a widening gap of cross-border holdings of bonds between pairs of
countries in the Euro-12, vis-à-vis pairs of countries outside this group. There is a perhaps
less striking, but still visible, increase in cross-border equity holdings among Euro-12 coun-
tries, as shown in Supplemental Figures 6 to 8. Finally, there seem to be relatively small
changes in FDI activity among Euro-12 countries, when compared to other bilateral groups.
The Figures suggest that there have indeed been important changes in capital markets coin-
ciding with the introduction of the euro. As pointed out by Japelli & Pagano (2008), these
changes in financial markets cannot be fully attributed to the use of a common currency;
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the introduction of the euro has also triggered a parallel deregulation process that removed
important barriers to trade in financial assets; the two eﬀects are hard to disentangle empir-
ically. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2008) argue more generally that common currencies are likely
to pave the way to broader structural reforms that foster flexibility and deeper integration.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the increased financial integration has not led to visible
improvements in the diversification of risk, at least not when compared with other countries
that are not part of the EZ (Caselli, 2008). This is roughly the conclusion from Supplemental
Figure 12 which shows the standard deviation of consumption growth for Euro-12, EU15,
EEA, and OECD93, relative to their corresponding values in 1993.22 The general pattern
is almost indistinguishable among these various groups. In terms of changes in allocative
eﬃciency across countries, perhaps a good macroeconomic proxy is the level of GDP per
capita. Gauged by this measure, see Supplemental Figure 13, there seems to be a slight
jump in 1999 for Euro-12 countries, creating a gap with respect to EU15, but by 2006 the
two groups are virtually back to the same relative position as in 1993. In other words, overall
growth during 1993-2007 has been almost identical for the countries in the Euro-12 and EU15
groups.23 The numbers are slightly more encouraging when compared to those in OECD93
or EEA. Judged by these macroeconomic indicators at least, deeper integration does not
seem to have materially aﬀected consumption smoothing or labor productivity growth in EZ
countries diﬀerently than in non-EZ countries.
22This is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly growth rate over a moving interval of 7 quarters.
23Recall that the EU15 control group comprises three countries: Denmark, Sweden and the United King-
dom.
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One conjectural explanation for the apparent lack of response of the real economy is that
there is little scope for diversification among EZ countries, as their business cycles are highly
synchronized; thus, Ingram (1962), Mundell (1973), and Buiter & Sibert (2008), have hy-
pothesized that in terms of seizing the gains from deeper capital market integration, currency
unions among highly unsynchronized countries may be more beneficial. A second conjecture
is that, because nominal bonds issued by member countries can no longer vary with changes
in nominal exchange rates, a common currency eliminates a potentially important source
of risk-sharing across borders.24 To the extent that consumption smoothing and GDP per
capita are better indicators of welfare than the various measures of integration, the findings
for the EZ do not seem to point to a clear improvement. But it may still be too early to
judge.
2.3 Commitment Gains
A potentially important benefit from joining a currency union is a reduction in inflation
rates, which is particularly relevant for countries that lack internal discipline and institutions
that ensure a low-inflationary environment. In the jargon of Alesina & Barro (2002), by
joining a monetary union with a credible anchor-country or set of countries, a client-country
eliminates the inflation bias arising from time inconsistency in monetary policy (Barro &
24See Lane (2006) and Neumeyer (1998).
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Gordon, 1983).25 Countries with a history of high inflation, hence, ceteris paribus, have more
to gain from joining a currency union, provided that low-inflation countries act as anchors.26
An earlier literature had stressed the need of similarity in inflation rates across countries
in the union as one of the OCA conditions. In particular, Fleming (1971) argued that
when inflation rates are stable and similar across countries, terms of trade will also remain
stable, reducing the incidence of external imbalances and the need for nominal exchange rate
adjustment. Indeed, this preoccupation was reflected in one of the conditions for accession
established in the Maastricht Treaty: A country could join the union if its inflation rate was
no higher than 1.5 percentage points above the three best-performing member states. This
rule was supplemented with fiscal rules, given the obvious inflationary threats posed by large
fiscal deficits and debts.
Given the Maastricht conditions, EZ countries had therefore narrowed their inflation-rate
diﬀerentials many years before the actual launching of the euro, with the exception of Greece,
which had to wait two more years to meet the criteria to join. After the launching of the
euro, however, inflation-rate diﬀerentials increased, with Germany at the lower bound of the
inflation range and Ireland at the upper bound. This is not surprising, and mostly reflects
variation in the prices of less tradeable goods (particularly non-financial services). Diﬀerences
in productivity growth (to some extent driven by catch-up eﬀects), changes in competition
leading to changes in mark-ups, and diﬀerent exposure to external shocks and international
25See also Alesina and Stella (2009), who discuss the rules versus discretion arguments as well as other
important institutional issues.
26Popular concerns in Germany about the loss of Bundesbank independence may suggest the union could
bring a loss of commitment to previously stable countries. But at least the early evidence of the euro does
not support these concerns.
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trade outside the EZ, among others, can in principle explain why some countries within the
union experienced higher levels of inflation (a Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect usually the underlying
channel). In all, the EZ performed very well. Some skeptics, however, have highlighted that
its performance was not unusual for the period: the post 1993 era has witnessed very low
inflation rates in all developed countries (Caselli, 2008). This is illustrated in Supplemental
Figure 14, which shows that average inflation rates in the three comparison groups (EU15,
EEA and OECD93) have been oscillating in a very narrow range since 1993. But one cannot
reject the alternative, and more positive, view that the overall good monetary performance
in developed countries has been itself an unexpected by-product of the introduction of the
euro and its commitment to stability, which left behind beggar-thy-neighbour inflationary
policies.
Whether or not similarity in inflation rates was needed as a pre-condition to join the euro
is less clear; indeed, the argument in Alesina & Barro (2002) suggests that a key reason for
countries with high-inflation records to join a union with credible anchors is the prospect of
low inflation after entering the union. In the interest of space, we do not discuss here how
the incentives to inflate of the union’s monetary authority change as the size of the union
increases. We refer the reader to Rogoﬀ (1985), Barro & Tenreyro (2006), and the references
therein.27
27We also refrain from discussing the vast literature on the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union
(or more generally, under cooperation). Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (1995) should be an obligatory starting point.
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3 The costs
Themain cost of joining a currency union is the loss of monetary policy independence, and the
consequent inability to react to shocks through exchange rate adjustments. Quantitatively
assessing this loss, however, is an extremely diﬃcult task, as there are many factors aﬀecting
the need and eﬀectiveness of monetary policy as an adjustment instrument.
In what follows, we discuss the main factors emphasized in the literature. We note that all
these factors (or OCA criteria) are endogenous and thus the conditions for optimality should
not be the pre-currency union conditions, but rather the ex-post conditions, after the union
is formed. We accordingly discuss, where available, the evidence on the eﬀect of currency
unions on the factors listed as OCA conditions. We also note that, in practice, even countries
that could potentially let their exchange rates adjust to mitigate the impact of shocks (self-
declared floaters), often display “fear of floating,” and thus do not exploit the automatic
stabilization properties of floating exchange rates (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002). This reluctance
to use monetary policy in the face of shocks might be linked to its actual eﬀectiveness or the
need for it (other mechanisms may facilitate the adjustment and/or render monetary policy
less eﬀective) or, possibly, to wider considerations, such as impairing long-term credibility, or
triggering beggar-thy-neighbor responses by trading partners, inducing excessive structural
volatility in financial markets.
3.1 Similarity of Shocks and Inflation
In his 1961 paper, Mundell highlighted that the pattern of shocks was a critical determinant
of the optimal size of a currency union. He defined “optimal” as achieving labor market
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and external equilibrium and did away with the presumption that common currencies and
national boundaries should coincide. He focused on a particular type of shock, a shift in
demand away from the output of one region towards the output of another. (Region, in this
case, is an area subject to the same shocks.) If each region had its own currency, a currency
depreciation in the region facing the adverse shock vis-à-vis the other currency would restore
external balance and prevent unemployment in the first region. If, however, both regions
were in monetary union, then unemployment would emerge in one region and inflationary
pressure in the other. In other words, monetary policy at the union level would be unable to
solve both problems of unemployment and inflation, if capital was mobile and regions were
subject to asynchronous shocks. The conclusion thus followed that regions with synchronous
shocks make ideal candidates to form currency unions, as there was no need for monetary
policy autonomy: A common monetary policy can restore equilibrium in all regions. (There
are, of course, many implicit assumptions in Mundell’s analysis, e.g., nominal rigidity, which
we will discuss later.)
The “similarity of shocks” later became a broader term to capture the incidence of both
supply and demand shocks, as well as the structure of the economy, which in turn may aﬀect
the nature and speed of adjustment of the economy to shocks.
An empirical literature pioneered by Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1993, 1997) has studied
the patterns of correlations of shocks across countries, trying to identify OCA candidates,
often using as benchmark the patterns of correlations across US states. The general finding
is that European countries have historically faced less correlated shocks than US states, and
hence forming a union in Europe may be costly. Alesina et al. (2002) use an alternative
sample and method to study the extent of similarity of shocks across countries, focusing on
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the covariance of relative shocks (to also capture the relative size of shocks, which is relevant
for the appropriateness of monetary policy). In particular, they study the advisability of a
dollar, euro, and yen blocs and reach optimistic conclusions about the prospect of a dollar-
and euro-area bloc, possibly enlarged by unilateral fixers.
The findings from these exercises should not be viewed as conclusive tests of the OCA
criteria. As already said, in principle it is ex-post synchronization of shocks that matters for
optimality. To assess ex-post optimality, Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro & Tenreyro (2007)
also study the eﬀect of currency unions on the pattern of covariance of shocks, using a broad
sample of developing and developed countries that includes existing currency unions. The
main result is that, while a common currency increases the comovement of “real” relative
price shocks, it tends to decrease the comovement of output shocks.
The decline in output comovement may reflect Krugman’s (1993) conjecture that inte-
gration leads to more specialization and thus less synchronization of shocks. Frankel & Rose
(1998), on the other hand, find in a sample of 21 industrialized countries that trade signif-
icantly increases the cross-country synchronization of shocks. If, indeed, currency unions
lead to more trade, then the two sets of results contradict each other. To complete the tax-
onomy of possibilities, Giannone & Reichlin (2006) find that the euro has had no detectable
eﬀect on the synchronization of shocks among EZ countries. The contradictions between
the conclusions of these studies may arise from diﬀerences in the period covered, samples of
countries, and methods used, as well as diﬀerences in the actual measures of synchronization.
The conclusion to draw is that there is ample scope for more work to shed light on the issue.
A second open question on this matter is whether synchronization (either ex-ante or ex-
post) is indeed needed. In his 1973 paper, Mundell argued that, because currency unions
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lead to deep integration in financial markets, countries with asynchronous shocks make ideal
candidates, as there are further benefits from risk diversification. The argument has been
more recently revived by Buiter & Sibert (2008) and formalized by Ching & Devereux (2003)
in a model that encompasses both the advantages and disadvantages of similarity of shocks in
a currency union; the model finds that there are neither substantial nor unambiguous eﬀects
on welfare, as the diversification motive and the similarity argument for common policy tend
to cancel each other. The results make intuitive sense, given the model.
In reality, however, adjustment costs are important and the idea that financial diversifica-
tion will be enough to smooth the shocks to consumption, and hence leave welfare unaltered,
misses the potentially important losses in human capital from a spell of high unemployment,
the costly work relations and information needed to transact in domestic and foreign mar-
kets, the fixed costs of closing and reopening plants, etc. Considering adjustment costs may
untie the results in favor of similarity. There is, on the other hand, of course, the question
of whether monetary policy is used as an adjustment tool, the premise that Calvo and Rein-
hart (2000) questioned. We think these are extremely relevant questions that have not yet
received compelling answers.
With regards to the need for ex-ante similarity in inflation rates, often listed as an OCA
criteria, we refer the reader to the discussion on inflation in Section 2.3.
3.2 Factor Mobility
Mundell (1961) pointed out that labor mobility can be an alternative adjustment mecha-
nism to restore equilibrium in regions subject to asymmetric shocks. If labor was mobile
across diﬀerent regions, then the unemployed in the adversely aﬀected regions could move
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to the boom regions without the need for active monetary policy. Whilst Mundell’s labor
mobility criterion has not gone without criticism,28 it remains one of the key concepts of an
undergraduate course in International Economics.
There is no consensus as to whether labor mobility can eﬀectively attenuate the cost of a
multi-country monetary union. Many have argued that labor mobility is unlikely to operate
at the high frequency with which demand shocks take place and is hence unlikely to be an
eﬀective substitute for active monetary policy. Furthermore, the high costs of migration
may entail larger welfare losses. In the context of the European Monetary Union (EMU),
Bayoumi & Prasad (1997) find that cross-country labor mobility is significantly lower than
across comparable US regions, where labor mobility tends to be an important equilibrating
force in the face of disturbances (Blanchard & Katz, 1992).29 In Europe, instead, the main
equilibrating mechanism appears to be changes in labor force participation (Decressin &
Fatas, 1995).
The lack of mobility may partly be a reflection of the vast heterogeneity in languages
and other cultural characteristics, as well as various other institutional or policy constraints,
including the lack of integration in pension systems and in educational and qualification
standards, the higher contractual costs of hiring and firing, and the generous unemployment
benefits in many European countries. Alesina et al. (2008), argue, however, that many of
these constraints may be aﬀected by the introduction of the euro, as countries find ways to
substitute for the lack of exchange-rate mechanism adjustment. They find that the introduc-
28Kenen (1969) suggests that it is only under very special circumstances that labor mobility solves both
labor market and trade balance. Moreover, inter-regional labor mobility requires occupational mobility,
which is rare. See also Ingram (1962).
29See also Eichengreen (1990) and Obstfeld & Peri (1998).
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tion of the euro has indeed aﬀected labor markets, although in complex ways. In particular,
they find that while there is no indication that the adoption of the euro has accelerated
labor market reforms in the primary labor markets, in several countries a “secondary” mar-
ket with temporary and much more flexible contracts has emerged. The authors also find
smaller “second-round” inflationary eﬀects, that is, a smaller adjustment of nominal wages
to past inflation and, accordingly, more real-wage flexibility in various countries. Further-
more, Alesina et al. (2008) find significant reforms in product markets, which as Blanchard
& Giavazzi (2003) argue, may be an important pre-condition to trigger labor-market reforms
that foster flexibility.30
In terms of capital mobility, we refer the reader to the discussion in Sections 2.1 and
2.2; in the interest of space, we do not attempt to distinguish between trade in capital and
non-capital goods, nor the extent to which trade in product markets itself substitutes for
the relative lack of mobility in factor markets. These are important empirical matters that
need further investigation.
3.3 Openness
McKinnon (1963) suggested size and openness of an economy as key determinants of the
decision to join a currency union. He argued that, rather than involving a loss of policy
autonomy, irrevocably fixing the nominal exchange rate could be a benefit for small, open
economies. This is because in a small, open economy, a large portion of consumption and
intermediate goods are imported and prices are given by international markets (perhaps we
should add here, following Engel (2000)’s insight, that in McKinnon’s analysis, which is
30Obligatory references on this topic are Saint-Paul (2000) and Saint Paul & Bentolila (2000).
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pertinent for small open economies, prices are set in the producer–or at least not local–
currency). In the limit–when all goods are tradable–a small economy is unable to influence
its real exchange rate by intervening in the foreign exchange market, and hence cannot use
its nominal exchange rate to influence competitiveness (Purchasing Power Parity holds). In
other words, fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate merely result in fluctuations in the
domestic price level for small, open economies via the eﬀect on import prices. Since the
currencies of small, open economies inherently suﬀer from shocks (due to specialization and
currency speculation), domestic prices would fluctuate in accordance. Therefore, giving up
monetary policy autonomy is no big loss.
McKinnon’s openness criterion has been criticized because his analysis is valid only when
the foreign price level is stable (Ishiyama, 1975). This is why, as stressed by Alesina & Barro
(2002), having a credibly stable anchor is critical. A perhaps repetitive point at this stage
is that if the degree of openness increases with the formation of the currency union as found
by the literature started by Rose (2000), whether due to the elimination of exchange risk,
transaction costs, or more generally because of other parallel reforms triggered by the union,
then the ex-ante OCA criterion is not the right metric and any cost-benefit analysis should
be based on the post-unification degree of openness.
3.4 Economic Diversification
Kenen (1969) proposed product diversification (in domestic production and exports) as an
OCA criterion. His argument rested on two reasons. First, the likelihood of asymmetric
shocks and their impact in the economy are small when exports are diversified. Second,
export diversity will help to stabilize investment, thereby requiring a smaller adjustment in
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prices and employment than would otherwise be required after an industry-specific export
shock. Kenen acknowledged the conflict that his first point gives rise to. Product diversi-
fication is not suﬃcient to guarantee internal stability even when external shocks tend to
average out. To achieve labor market equilibrium, there needs to be suﬃcient occupational
mobility so that the unemployed resources in the adversely hit sectors are re-employed in the
growing sectors. At the empirical level, and in the context of the EMU, Bayoumi & Prasad
(1997) provide a comparative study of industrial diversification in European countries and
US regions. The main finding is that, on this criterion, there do not seem to be significant
diﬀerences between Europe and the US.
Because more developed and bigger economies tend to be more diversified (Koren &
Tenreyro, 2007), Kenen (1969)’s OCA criterion points to a completely diﬀerent set of ideal
candidates for unification than McKinnon (1963)’s. Put diﬀerently, the list of countries
that do not satisfy either of these two criteria for OCA (or the list of countries that satisfy
both) is nearly empty. To our knowledge, there is no work trying to clearly assess the
comparative welfare or output losses from relinquishing monetary policy independence in
diversified economies vis-à-vis small, open (and typically specialized) economies, and hence
the relevance of these two opposing OCA criteria. We think this deserves further study.
3.5 Price and Wage flexibility
In a seminal paper, Friedman (1953) makes the case for flexible exchange rates given the
intrinsic nominal rigidity that impairs the adjustment of the economy in the face of shocks.
The case depends critically on the extent of nominal rigidity. In the extreme of perfect
nominal flexibility, monetary policy is neutral and hence the choice of exchange rate regime
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becomes irrelevant. This was also pointed out by Mundell (1961) and is one important
OCA criterion–and to some extent underpins McKinnon (1963)’s criterion, as small, open
economies face, from their perspective, flexible prices.
A more recent literature, largely inspired by Devereux & Engel (1998) and Engel (2000),
has argued that price rigidity is not suﬃcient to advocate a flexible exchange rate regime,
all else equal. In particular, this literature shows that if there is pricing-to-market and
prices are rigid in the local (destination) currency, there is low pass-through from exchange
rate changes. In this case, exchange rate changes do not aﬀect export prices in destination
countries and hence do not induce changes in the demand for exports. Various empirical
studies by Engel and coauthors also present empirical evidence on the low extent of pass-
through, supporting his case. The argument is challenged, to some extent, by the usual
surges in political pressure for depreciation amidst recessions, which typically invoke the
need to increase firms’ competitiveness in foreign markets. The issue has spawned a large
and growing literature exploring the extent of pass-through and its determinants. Given
space constraints, we refrain from reviewing this work. (For a diﬀerent perspective, see, for
example, Imbs et al., 2005, and the references therein.)
3.6 Fiscal Transfers
Kenen (1969) also argues that the provision of fiscal transfers can significantly mitigate the
cost of relinquishing monetary policy autonomy, as it can cushion the eﬀects of economic
disturbances. For the US economy, a number of papers, including Sala-i-Martin & Sachs
(1992), von Hagen (1992), and Bayoumi &Masson (1995), empirically studied the mechanism
and its quantitative relevance. Whether or not cross-country fiscal transfers are needed and,
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in particular, whether financial integration can be a substitute for them (either through well
diversified sovereign funds held by national governments, or directly through private capital
markets), is part of an ongoing debate.
Fiscal transfers, and more generally, fiscal policy under monetary unions, are part of a
vast literature that we do not attempt to review in this short survey. A non-exhaustive list
of references that can serve as guidance are von Hagen & Eichengreen (1996), Beetsma &
Uhlig (1999), Dixit & Lambertini (2001), Uhlig (2003), Cooper & Kempf (2004), and Chari
& Kehoe (2007, 2008).31
4 Summary and open issues on normative and positive
aspects of currency unions
Before Mundell (1961)’s pathbreaking contribution, currency areas were inextricably
bounded by country borders. Unsurprisingly, then, previous work had concentrated on the
pros and cons of flexible versus fixed exchange rate regimes across countries. Mundell broke
the conceptual constraint, and used the insights from the early literature to build the theory
of currency unions.32 Mundell (1961) pointed out that monetary unification could lead to
increased integration in goods and capital markets and that this gain should be weighed
against the loss of monetary policy independence. He also noted that three conditions–
similarity of shocks, nominal flexibility, and factor mobility–would reduce the cost of the
31See also earlier work by De Grauwe (1994), Canzonieri & Diba (1991), Aizenman (1992), Sibert (1992),
and Buiter et al. (1993).
32In particular, Mundell’s work has been greatly influenced by his advisor James Meade (see, for example,
Meade, 1957).
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loss of monetary independence, and hence balance the choice of regime in favor of mon-
etary unification. Mundell’s contribution inspired a vast normative literature establishing
additional conditions under which relinquishing monetary policy independence would be less
disadvantageous; these additional conditions–together with Mundell’s–are known as the
OCA criteria.
A first wave of empirical work tried to quantitatively assess the various OCA conditions,
particularly in the context of EMU countries, using as a benchmark comparable regions in the
US. The results of these exercises were qualified by the likely possibility that once countries
entered or formed the union, many of the original conditions (e.g., synchronization of shocks,
openness, etc.) might change. It was not until Rose (2000), however, that the empirical
literature really surged. Rose’s provocative paper (and his novel dataset) stimulated a large
and growing literature trying to empirically assess the economic eﬀects of currency unions.
The advent of the euro, in turn, provided yet another ground to test the impact of a common
currency. While the jury is still out on the actual magnitudes, some consensus is emerging.
With regard to trade gains, for the small and relatively less developed economies in
Rose’s historical data, currency unions are associated with large increases in the volume of
international trade. For countries in the EZ, the eﬀect appears more elusive: In particular,
we could not find statistically significant eﬀects on trade among EZ members following
the introduction of the euro, though previous work has found positive, yet generally small,
eﬀects. In terms of financial integration, important changes in trends are observed with
the introduction of the euro, particularly for cross-border holdings of bonds and equity.
Concerning inflation, variability of consumption, and output growth, changes stemming from
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the introduction of the euro are less visible, particularly when compared to other developed
countries in the EU.
There are, in general, less conclusive results on the costs of currency unions (that is, the
various OCA criteria) and the extent to which they endogenously change with the use of
a common currency. Empirical work exploiting the timing of the euro will shed more light
on the question. Notably, Alesina et al. (2008) and Bugamelli et al. (2008) find evidence
that the euro has forced significant structural reforms and firm restructuring; this should
facilitate the response of national economies to shocks, thus substituting at least partly for
the traditional exchange-rate mechanism of adjustment. There is also a growing branch of
the literature studying both theoretically and empirically fiscal aspects of currency unions,
as well as the extent of price and wage rigidity, currency choice, labor market frictions, and
diversification patterns, the results of which may aﬀect the current view on the relevant OCA
criteria.
While significant progress on the empirical assessment of the various gains and costs is
under way, the theory of currency unions begs for a unified framework that can incorporate
the various relevant factors determining optimality. Important starting points are Alesina &
Barro (2002) and Ching & Devereux (2003).33 The first weights trade and credibility gains
against the cost of asynchronous shocks, in the absence of financial markets. The second,
by contrast, stresses the gain from integration in financial markets facilitated by currency
unions. Not surprisingly, the extent of dissimilarity of shocks weighs very diﬀerently in the
33See Carre & Collard (2003), Faia (2007), and Christoﬀel et al. (2009), who also analyze specific gains
and costs from a monetary union. More broadly, on welfare-based analysis of diﬀerent aspects of monetary
interdependence, see Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (1995).
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two analyses. In Alesina & Barro (2002), dissimilarity of shocks is a key determinant of
the cost of joining a currency union, as in Mundell (1961); in Ching & Devereux (2003),
dissimilarity can rather act as a benefit, fostering diversification of shocks and a smoother
path for consumption, as suggested by Mundell (1973).
A unified welfare-based framework should resolve the seeming contradiction in the roles
played by these and the various other criteria that we discuss, and thus help move the theory
of currency union beyond a narrative enumeration of gains and costs. It should also clarify the
implicit assumptions about the economy underlying the various OCA criteria. Guidance from
recent empirical developments, in turn, should help operationalize the theoretical framework,
and turn it into a quantitative model for policy evaluation.
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Table 1: Estimates of the euro eﬀect (CU)
for three diﬀerent control groupsa
OECD93 EEA EU15
CU −0.084 −0.006 0.065
(1.958) (0.107) (0.578)
Euro-12 dummy 0.356 0.398 0.227
(3.385) (2.929) (1.207)
FTA 0.886 − −
(7.123) − −
Log-distance (1st Quartile) −0.494 −0.639 −0.696
(4.537) (7.039) (5.962)
Log-distance (2nd Quartile) −0.513 −0.642 −0.709
(5.008) (7.225) (6.055)
Log-distance (3rd Quartile) −0.552 −0.663 −0.723
(5.654) (7.986) (6.717)
Log-distance (4th Quartile) −0.581 −0.714 −0.764
(6.041) (8.615) (6.866)
Contiguity dummy 0.279 0.101 0.030
(3.039) (1.154) (0.282)
Common-language dummy 0.468 0.621 0.630
(4.888) (8.402) (6.961)
Colonial-tie dummy −0.147 0.113 0.113
(1.029) (0.721) (0.678)
Sample Size 6930 4080 2730
R2 0.979 0.978 0.981
RESET test p-values 0.264 0.990 0.407
a) All regressions are performed by Poisson PML and include time-
varying importer and exporter fixed eﬀects; robust (clustered by
country-pair) t-ratios in parentheses.
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FIGURE 1: Bilateral Trade Relative to GDP for Diﬀerent Bilateral Groups (OECD93):
exports of the Euro-12 countries to trading partners of the same group (circles) and to
OECD93 countries (squares), both relative to the total GDP of the Euro-12; exports from
the eleven OECD93 countries to the members of this group (triangles) and to the Euro-12
countries (crosses), both relative to the total GDP of the OECD93 countries. All series are
normalized to 1 in 1993.
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